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SOME MODERN CONTACTS BETWEEN COURTS OF
EQUITY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
BY WILLIAm H. LLOYD*

N

o one is, perhaps, so acutely aware of the unsystematic character of our law as the teacher. He must, in the first place,
agree with his colleagues upon their respective spheres of influence; and then, in endeavoring to present his subject to his students in a complete and orderly manner, he is constantly confronted
with problems that tempt him to poaching expeditions on his
colleagues' most treasured preserves. He must, if he desires to be
understood, present his material with traditional arrangements
constantly in mind, yet as he sits surrounded by the advance reports no one is more conscious than he, of shifts of emphasis
and interest in the law that leave some historic titles barren, and
disturb the symmetry of others. But the annoyance of the cloistered mind at the disorder of the law is seldom reflected by the
active bar, nourished on and seasoned by confusion as it is; too
busy on the firing line to notice problems of strategy. The anomalous state of modern equity is an example.
It is familiar history that the expansion of equity was due
to the use of the chancellors' court as an instrument of law
reform, supplying deficiencies substantive and procedural in the
common law, due very largely to the inability of the common law
courts to cope with the economic changes, and the increasing
complexity of society in a period of world wide discoveries and
great commercial expansion. By the early years of the nineteenth
century chancery had completed its work; Mr. justice Story's
*Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
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book sums it up. Not that the doctrines and remedies of equity
are incapable of extensioh to new but analogous situations; they
are so extended. But as an aid in the growth of the law equity
had gone about as far as the machinery invented by the mediaeval
chancellors could successfully carry it. In the wake of the
industrial revolution came problems varied and novel, due to increasing population and higher standards of living, to the growth
of corporations and other forms of association, to scientific discoveries and inventions-problems at times quite beyond the
competency of both ancient systems-law and equity. An era
of legislation followed which has not only given new form to
many titles of substantive law but also set up new tribunals for
the more effective accomplishment of its purposes.
Our judicial organization and the great body of American
law is based on conditions prevailing in the years immediately
following independence, when the country comprised a homogeneous pioneer rural community with small towns as centers of
distribution. The legal problems were simple and familiar, capable of solution by the leisurely application of traditional methods.
Not so the problems of a highly industrialized urban society. As
Dean Pound has pointed out there is at present, as in Tudor
England, a reversion to justice without law which takes place
when the orthodox legal machinery for the time being is not fulfilling its ends, either because its procedure is inadequate to meet
the needs of a generation impatient of formalism, or because the
substance of its doctrines have not expanded to meet the needs
of the times.' Hence the movement from judicial to executive
justice administered by a variety of boards, commissions and other
state and municipal agencies, the jurisdiction and powers con ferred
on these extra-judicial bodies resting on legislation passed at
various times to meet pressing emergencies in a nmanner thoroughly unsystematic and capricious. Unlike continental Europe
where long experience under highly centralized and absolute monarchies had prepared the ground for a trained bureaucracy and a
consciously developed system of administrative law, 2 our people
have clung to theories of decentralization and amateur officials
that cannot be reconciled with the proper co-ordination of our
prolific social machinery hastily instailed for the handling of situa'Pound,
Executive Justice, (1907) 55 Am. L. Reg. 137.
2

See Garner, French Administrative Law, (1924) 33 Yale L. J. 597.
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tions beyond the traditional competency of the courts. Administrative law is, indeed, a new word in our jurisprudence, not to
be found as a title in the text books and encyclopaedias of law in
common use among lawyers. There is no such title in the American Digest System, although it now appears for cross references
in the Descriptive Word Index to the Third Decennial Digest.
To students of political science we owe it, chiefly, that the bar is
beginning to understand that, on its legal side, public administration is confronted with problems presented by various departments of the government that have a common philosophy
and may be studied and compared collectively with profit. As
hereafter the substantive content of administrative law itself
becomes better defined, so the respective spheres of influence
of the newer tribunals and the old will be more precisely limited.
Just now there are fields partly in the possession of both, and in
the discussion of some of the modem decisions on the jurisdiction
and functions of various public commissions faint echoes are
heard of the controversies of Lord Ellesmere and Sir Edward
Coke. Fortunately, or unfortunately impatient souls would say,
we have no dictator to settle these questions with a nod of the
head. Democracy itself is torn between a desire for the efficiency
and expedition promised by the administrative specialist and the
security that is sometimes actually and sometimes mistakenly supposed to be guaranteed'by the rule of law.
An example of a subject that lies on the border line of equity
and administrative law is nuisance. Here equity first interposed
centuries ago because the remedy by assize of nuisance had broken
down, owing to its archaic procedure, and the remedy by action
on the case for damages was in many instances inadequate. For
a long time the remedy by injunction was sufficiently effective,
and it still is so for some purposes. But the abnormal growth
and continual change that characterizes our cities and their suburbs
makes it increasingly difficult for a judge sitting as chancellor
to determine what is a nuisance under the circumstances of the
case, without arrogating to himself alone the determination of
the policy to be adopted for the development of the entire neighborhood. The lack of harmony in the many cases dealing with
garages and gasoline filling stations is an illustration of the embarrassment that a judge is frequently subjected to in the decision
of a question that is less a matter of law than municipal policy.
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Zoning systems and systematic town planning anticipate such
problems and to that extent relieve courts of equity from the
decision of difficult and embarrassing neighborhood disputes due
to the haphazard growth of American cities. In this way the
special character and interests of a community may be protected
by a consensus of opinion voiced in general ordinances, instead
of being left to the uncertainties resulting from the varying degrees of litigious pugnacity in the individuals affected. It may
be urged that the substitution of bureaucratic direction for individual pugnacity as the arbiter of conflicting interests is a sad
departure from the sturdy ways of our ancestors. A tear may
be dropped for the progress of socialism. But the use or abuse
of unpopular epithets does not really make much difference if the
majority of property owners finally decide that they prefer the
at least presumptive security of a zoning ordinance to the unpredictable hazards of successive bills in equity for injunctions. It
is worth noting that such protection as real property heretofore
enjoyed, in its development for restricted use, resulted from the
specific enforcement by courts of equity of agreements between
vendor and vendee as to the use of the land conveyed, a doctrine
the origin of which no doubt lies in the fact that in the early
years of the nineteenth century there was no thought of systematic
town planning under state or municipal direction. On the
other hand the growth of public town planning may have been
retarded through the existence of an equitable doctrine that protected private initiative in settling the course of new developments while leaving the older communities to their customary
architectural anarchy.
Another example of a situation that outgrew the capacity of
chancery is found in a line of cases of which Powell Duffryn
Steam Coal Co. v. Taft Vale Railway Co.,' is a leading example.
There an injunction was refused to restrain the defendants, lessees
of a railway, from interfering with the use of the railway by the
plaintiffs, it being impossible for the plaintiffs to exercise their
legal rights without danger unless there was a continuous use
of signals by the defendants' employees. Specific performance
of contracts involving complicated details and calling for continuous supervision over long periods of time will, according to
the traditional view, be refused.4 But this attitude is somewhat
3I, R. (1874) 9 Ch. App. 331.
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relaxed in later cases where there is a public interest in the
enforcement of such-contracts entered into by railroads or other
agencies of transportation enjoying public franchises.5 Nevertheless, in spite of this extension of the jurisdiction of courts of
equity, candor compels one to admit that the machinery of the
public service commission is better adapted to the hearing and
decision of such disputes, which usually involve technical problems of engineering and questions of community interests, than
proceedings in equity before judges hampered by the necessity
of conforming to the traditional practice of the courts, without the expert knowledge and special experience that would best
fit them to cope with powerful and well advised litigants, and
with no representation of the public except insofar as the contending parties can by plausible argument identify their own with
the public's interest. Yet it would be premature to say that because so much of this field is now covered by the activities of the
public service commissions and similar bodies, that this branch
of equity jurisdiction is in any sense obsolete. Recourse must
necessarily be had to the administrative body where state or federal statute requires it. But even the practitioner in this highly
specialized form of litigation would hesitate to say that there are
not gaps in the statutory regulations and procedure that can only
be dosed by an occasional resort to equity.
The foregoing are illustrations of cases where the executive
branch of the government has been empowered to carry into
effect policies, and to reconcile conflicting interests in disputes,
for the investigation and determination of which neither law nor
equity are properly equipped. In other striking instances courts
of equity have been harnessed anew to the work of administration. Now the courts are held by judges who are public servants and who have always been required to perform services
not strictly judicial that have varied with the fashions and patterns of the times. Anciently the business! of the common law
side of the court of chancery was nearly all administrative.' But
for a long time emphasis has rested on the judicial side of this
4Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., (1912) 234 Pa. St. 193, 83 Atd.
6?; Ward
v. Newbold, (1911) 115 Aid. 689, 81 Atl. 793.
5
Joy v. St. Louis, (1890) 138 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. 243, 34 L. Ed.
843; Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co. v. Coney Island & B. R. Co., (1894)
144 N. Y. 152, 39 N. E. 17. See (1916) 63 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 198;
(1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 439.
63 Blackstone, Commentaries

47.
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as well as other courts. Even without the aid of the doctrine
of the separation of the powers, it is customary to think of the
court as standing apart from disputes between official and citizen.
But the passion for minding the business of others which paradoxically rules this land of the free has forced upon the courts
duties unwelcomed and unsought. It was long the policy of
chancery not to interfere in the administration of the criminal
law,- a sound policy and carefully adhered to so long as the
rise and fall of the Court of Star Chamber was held in renembrance as part of our political tradition. The twentieth century,
however, has seen an increasing tendency, through statutory extensions of the law of nuisance, to convert the courts, in the
exercise of equity powers, into instruments of police. The socalled "padlocking" cases are a familiar instance.' National prohibition has greatly extended this jurisdiction and the fact that
it has proved perhaps the most successful and effective implement in the enforcement of the law may tempt legislatures to
apply similar methods to other newly invented forms of misconduct. The possibilities of such extensions are unlimited, once
the injunction, with its indefinite sanctions, is accepted as a normal method of suppressing the unruly instincts of the community.
Only in trade and labor disputes has serious objection been urged
to the extension of chancery's powers and that on economic
rather than juristic grounds. A very slight change in the constitutional temperament, if it may be so described, may lead to
a state of mind where the injunction may become, by common
consent, the most useful adjunct of administrative despotism ever
invented. At present no one save a few grumblers seems to
mind government by injunction except trade unions.
On the other hand, far more frequently has the aid of chancery been sought as a check upon administrative action. So many
bills of this sort are brought every year that a survey of this
field would involve a review of a large part of the modern law
of injunctions. Over sixty such cases were counted in the title
injunctions in a recent volume of the Current Digest of the
7State v. District Court, (1926) 77 Mont. 361, 251 Pac. 137, 49
A. L. R. 627 and note; Symphony Theater v. Ely, (1919) 187 App.
Div. 757, 176 N. Y. S. 52; State v. Bruch, (1925) 318 Ill. 307, 149 N. E.
262. Compare Bouchard v. Zetley, (1928) 196 Wis. 635, 220 N. W. 209.
8Commonwealth v. Dietz, (1926) 285 Pa. St. 511, 132 AtlI. 572;
Littleton v. Fritz, (1885) 65 Iowa 488, 22 N. W. 641; 1 Ames, Cases on
Equity 81 and note; Pompano Horse Club v. State, (1927) 93 Fla. 415,
111 So. 801.
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American Digest System that touched almost every phase of state
and local government. A significant statutory strengthening of
this jurisdiction has conferred upon Federal district courts under
the national prohibition act jurisdiction to review "by appropriate proceedings in a court of equity" the refusal of the
commissioner of internal revenue to grant permits to deal in
denatured alcohol.9 Here the district court sitting in equity is
charged with what is in effect an administrative appeal. On the
other hand, the jurisdiction may be restricted, as by a law forbidding injunctions to prevent the execution of public statutes
by officers of the law."0 Usually injunctions against administrative acts are sought on some general theory of equitable jurisdiction such as the protection of personal or property rights, guaranteed by the constitution, where the legal remedy is inadequate.
Our habit is to regard the courts as the lone watch dogs of the
constitution, a responsibility that might have been imposed on other
branches of the government, or at least divided. With weary
reiteration it is said that equity will not restrain the enforcement
of the criminal law or of penal proceedings."" But as statutory
administrative regulations have multiplied, enforced by penal proceedings, allegations of irreparable injury have been accepted as
the basis for injunctions where the validity or constitutionality of
the law or ordinance under which the public authorities were proceeding was in question,'1- or where the number of prosecutions
begun or threatened seemed to indicate a needless multiplicity
of actions. 13
Closely allied are the tax cases. It has been said many times
that equity will not enjoin the collection of a tax unless it is not
only apparent that the collection is illegal but that the property
owner is without an adequate remedy by ordinary legal process,' 4
9

Smith v. Foster, (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 115.
lOLos Angeles C. F. Dist. v. Superior Court, (Cal. App. 1928) 271
Pac. 518.
"David v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, (1878)
75 N. Y. 362, 2 Ames, Cases on Equity 106 and note; Cullen v. Esola,
(D. C. Cal. 1927) 21 F. (2d) 877.
' -Martin v. Baldy, (1915) 249 Pa. St. 253, 94 At. 1091; Davis v.
Berry, (D.C. Iowa 1914) 216 Fed. 413; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,
(1927) 274 U. S. 445, 47 Sup. Ct. 681, 71 L. Ed. 1146.
"3Third Ave. Ry. v. Mayor, (1873) 54 N.Y. 159; 3Iahoning &S. Ry. Co.
v. New Castle, (1912) 233 Pa. St. 413, 82 Atl. 501; Chaires v. City of
Atlanta,
(1927) 164 Ga. 755, 139 S. E. 559.
14Pittsburg Ry. v. Board of Public Works, (1898) 172 U. S. 321,
19 Sup. Ct. 216, 43 L. Ed. 463, 2 Freund, Cases Admin. Law 557;
McTwiggan v. Hunter, (1897) 18 R. I. 776, 30 At. 962, 2 Ames, Cases
on Equity 71 and note.
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a process which too frequently is' the aged and embalmed remnant of early American legislation. It is urged that a court of
equity would be hampered in doing complete justice, since it
cannot apportion the tax or make a new assessment. There are
also reasons of policy involved founded on the necessity for the
prompt collection of taxes for the support of the government.
Nevertheless, there are frequent instances in which the illegality
of a tax, or its assessment, has been-regarded as sufficient reason
for enjoining its collection on the ground of lack of remedy or
inadequacy of remedy that are indistinguishable, or distinguished
with difficulty, from those decisions that take the opposite view."
Here as in other cases that might be cited, in spite of an avowed
policy of non-interference with the administration, in spite of a
marked reluctance to interpose in fiscal affairs of the state, courts
of equity have been drawn in as arbiters of public law, probably,
in the first place, because under our crude political conditions there
were, unfortunately, no other bodies of educated public servants
capable of solving administrative problems according to general
principles.
This borderland of the executive and judicial functions has
an embarrassing side to the law teacher when compelled to fix his
attention on that perennial source of annoyance, the curriculum.
Tradition has placed these problems in the equity course, in the
sections dealing with injunctions and bills of peace. But in a
course on administrative law, which every year becomes more
essential if we are to keep abreast of the times, the same group
of problems viewed from a slightly different angle springs up
in the section dealing with relief against administrative action, and
bills for injunctions must be considered along with mandamus,
certiorari and statutory appeals. These cases are vital to a course
on administrative law. As our political system is now constituted they cannot be disregarded. They are not so vital to equity
-that is there are more things to be taught in equity than can
possibly be crowded into the allotted hours and it would relieve
the tension if the course on administrative law would take over
all those cases where equitable relief is sought by or against public officers, commissions, boards and other administrative agencies,
15Bangers Appeal, (1885) 109 Pa. 79; Baltica Ins. Co. v. Cair, (1928)
330 IIl. 608, 162 N. E. 178; Southern Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, (C.C.A. 9th
Cir. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 814; Jefferson City Bridge & T. Co. v. Blaser,
(1927) 318 Mo. 373, 300 S. W. 778.
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care being taken that the student taking equity alone is put on
his guard as to the importance of this group of problems not
covered.
But the troubles of the curriculum committee are only a pale
reflection of the 'confusion of thought that pervades our political
system. In spite of much grumbling and continual criticism of
the courts, the unpleasant truth remains that our lamentable failure, so far, in nation and state, to develop an intelligent, high
minded, non-partisan civil service leaves many branches of the
administration with few officials to whom the man in the street
can appeal with any degree of confidence in their capacity, impartiality or integrity. We cannot have our cake and eat it.
We cannot have the spoils system and the type of administration
our publicists envisage. Of recent years there has been, in this
respect, an improvement- in the type and quality of permanent
officials, more particularly in the Federal service, and today the
supervision of public functionaries is, practically, divided between
the courts in the exercise of their equitable as well as statutory
powers, and the various boards, commissions and officials that
make up the ruling hierarchy of the administration proper. It
will be most interesting to watch the further growth of this
divided jurisdiction. If the executive officers increase in prestige by sound, efficient and impartial administration, it is to be
expected that public confidence will award them the status they
deserve and that the courts will be led to abandon their habitual
interference -with executive functions. Public opinion will support and legislation will strengthen the authority of its officers
and boards when and only when they emancipate themselves from
the pressure of the party machine and build up a tradition of
authority. Until then Mr. Citizen will continue to choose his
public agents with a gesture of contempt, will use them when he
can, and at other times will fight them with every technicality
that the legal art-can devise.
There is a further possibility that the convenience of the injunction as a weapon of offense may produce a state of mind
on the part of the bureaucracy itself that may lead to the unofficial incorporation of courts of equity in the administrative system. The chancellor was originally an executive officer and he
may become that once more, justifying the fears of colonial Nlassachusetts and Pennsylvania. He was also once an ecclesiastic

MI'A'EsOTi LAW REVIJEW

and he may once more as a quasi ecclesiastic assist in a campaign
of intensive purification. If a bishop could become a chancellor,
surely a chancellor may become a bishop. There are, one ma'
add, many instances where botlh government and public are more
concerned with the prompt and authoritative interpretation of a
statute or the legality of official procedure than with the orthodoxy of the means by which this interpretation is produced. In
many cases where an injunction is formally sought the true
object of the proceeding is to obtain what is in effect a declaratory
judgment upon the point in doubt-such as the legality of a
municipal bond issue, the validity of a scheme of public improvement, the interpretation of obscure administrative details in a
recent statute. General acquiescence in such procedure is part
of the modern tendency toward prophylaxis. There is indeed
no good reason why there should not be preventive law as well
.as medicine, and, until American public law is recast on more
_symmetrical lines, one must count on the continued employment
of courts of equity in this field. In exploring this territory
where the executive and judicial powers meet, the view point
-of the publicist and the administrative official is functional. They
see equity working with well tested machinery and in the possession of a formidable weapon for offense and defense-the
injunction. The problem for them is how this weapon-the most
powerful instrument of the law-may be applied most advantageously to the purposes of government and at the same time
be prevented from interfering with the operations of government. The view point of the jurist is rational. He knows his
instrument and is concerned chiefly with the technique of its use
in which he has the assistance of a tradition embodied in many
treatises and precedents. He proceeds with caution lest lie blunt
the fine edge of his tool, but like all technicians he will not trust
his instrument in untrained hands, and to his specialized mind the
,public functionary in the art of administering justice is a mere
,amateur. In the reform of civil procedure, long overdue in this
country, a rearrangement of the courts and a redistribution of
jurisdiction might transfer not a little of this part of equitable
jurisprudence to a division of the court that would specialize in
public law, a practical adaptation of contemporary European
.methods to American conditions. But the process of change, if it
comes, will be slow. So vast are the interests involved, so amorphous. so comj)licated the structure of our institutions. so new the
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physical conditions under which we live that it may turn out that
this generation has not the capacity, the political insight, to make
a thorough audit of the economic and juristic melange that constitutes our social system. It may be intellectually unable to frmne
a system of public law at this time sufficiently simple and popular
to stand a chance of relative permanence. Even so, and granting
a present lethargy in constitution building, our publicists must do
what they can to reduce the friction and confusion that characterizes our incorrigible pioneering attitute toward public life, some
phases of which our topic illustrates.

